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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent, :
v.

:

FRANK DAVID GENTRY,

:

Case No. 890145-CA

Priority 2

Defendant/Appellant. :
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of a third degree
felony in the Fifth District Court.

This Court has jurisdiction

to hear this case under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f)(Supp.
1989).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did defendant waive his objection to the trial

judge's failure to disqualify himself by failing to raise it
sooner and by failing to take steps to obtain a ruling on the
belated motion?
2.

Did defendant waive consideration of his motion for

a new trial when he failed to object to the court's failure to
rule?
3.

Did the trial court err by refusing to allow

withdrawal of defendant's guilty plea that was voluntary, knowing
and intelligent?

4.

Where the trial court found that defendant's guilty-

plea was valid, are his claims of ineffectiveness of counsel for
failing to investigate, failing to withdraw from representing
defendant when he chose to plead guilty, failing to move to
disqualify the trial judge, and failing to assert certain
defenses waived?

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The text of all relevant authorities is set forth
within the Argument portion of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with theft by deception, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405
(1978); and criminal trespass, a class C misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206 (1978) (R. 26-28).

After

a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over on theft, a third
degree felony; and criminal trespass (R. 24, 25).
On January 25, 1989, a trial commenced before the
Honorable J. Philip Eves, sitting without a jury (T. 4-8). After
the close of the evidence and just prior to closing arguments,
defendant changed his plea from not guilty to guilty of theft, a
third degree felony (T. 181). The State dismissed count two (T.
187).

Judge Eves stayed imposition of sentence and placed

defendant on 18 months probation (T.177,181).
It appears that this appeal could soon become moot.
Defendant's 18 month probation is nearly expired. In Holmes v.
United States, 383 F.2d 925, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1967), the court held
that an appeal was moot where the sentence was served and there
were no collateral disadvantages which the appellant might incur

-2-

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant and his five siblings each inherited an equal
share of the Fremont Ranch from their parents (T. 11-12, 19). In
1981, the property was partitioned and defendant's share was
purchased from him for $21,833 (T. 13, 20, 41, 63-64, 127).
After the partition sale, even though he retained the
money given him for the land and knew the owners wanted him off
of the land, defendant continued to use the ranch (T. 72-73,
130).

In 1983, defendant retained an attorney and attempted to

purchase a portion of the ranch from two of the owners (T. 76-7 7,
ex. P-20).

In 1986 and 1987 defendant and his son, codefendant

Curtis Gentry, received payments from Carlisle Stirling for
grazing of the ranch property (T. 83-85).

The family members who

then owned the ranch did not give defendant or his son permission
to use or to lease the ranch to others (T. 20-21, 41-42, 48-49,
ex. P-3 at 3, 64, 67, 72, 99). The owners did not receive any
part of the money collected by defendant and his son (T. 64, 67,
147, 159).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant did not raise his claim that the trial judge
should disqualify himself until after the motion to withdraw the
plea had been under advisement for several months.

Then, when

defendant received a ruling on this motion that was issued four
days after he filed his motion to disqualify, defendant did not

Cont. as a result of the conviction. Here, if defendant
satisfactorily completes his probation, the case will be
dismissed. At that time there will be no collateral consequences
remaining, and no reason to continue this appeal.

object to the failure to rule.

In this circumstance, defendant's

claim is waived.
Defendant's motion for a new trial was filed only four
days prior to the ruling denying his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea.

Again, defendant did not object to the ruling on

the motion to withdraw his plea or otherwise notify the court
that there was an outstanding motion to be ruled upon.

In this

instance, this case should not be remanded for a ruling on the
motion for a new trial.
The record supports that defendant's plea was
voluntary, knowing and intelligent.
entire trial before pleading guilty.

Defendant sat through the
The record discloses that

he heard and understood the plea agreement.

The trial judge

properly refused to allow him to withdraw his plea.
Defendant's guilty plea waives his ineffectiveness of
counsel claims because they do not go to the validity of his
plea.

Even if defendant had not waived these claims, the record

discloses that trial counsel was effective.

Defendant fails to

establish that counsel rendered a deficient performance that
prejudiced him.

His conviction should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL
JUDGE SHOULD HAVE DISQUALIFIED HIMSELF;
ALTERNATIVELY, DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO
DISQUALIFY THE TRIAL JUDGE.
After defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea and
after the trial judge took the motion under advisement, defendant
filed a motion to disqualify the trial judge.
-4-

This motion

arrived in the district court four days prior to the judge
issuing his ruling on the motion to withdraw the plea.

After the

judge issued his ruling that defendant would not be allowed to
withdraw his plea, defendant did not object to the ruling.
Defendant also did not advise the judge that he had failed to
rule on the motion to disqualify.

Under the circumstances of

this case, the judge did not err in failing to rule on the motion
to disqualify because defendant did nothing to bring the motion
to the judge's attention.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-29(c) (Supp. 1989) provides that
if a defendant files an affidavit alleging bias and prejudice on
the part of the trial judge, the judge shall proceed no further
until the challenge is disposed of.

The affidavit must be filed

"as soon as practicable after the case has been assigned or the
bias or prejudice is known."

Icl. In this case, defendant did

not file his motion to disqualify Judge Eves until the motion to
withdraw the plea had been taken under advisement and the judge
was ready to rule.

Defendant does not indicate when he

discovered that Judge Eves might be a witness if he received a
new trial.

He certainly does not allege that he learned of this

fact just prior to filing the motion.
Further, when defendant received his copy of Judge
Eves' ruling denying the motion to withdraw the plea that
contained no ruling on the motion to disqualify, it was incumbent
upon defendant to object to that ruling in the trial court.
Defendant's failure to notify Judge Eves of the oversight should
bar defendant from raising this issue on appeal.

-R-

This is

analogous to the situation where a defendant fails to object to
the admission of evidence at trial or objects on some ground but
not the ground asserted on appeal.

See State v. Barella, 714

P.2d 287, 288 (Utah 1986); and State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660
(Utah 1985).

This situation is also analogous to the situation

where a defendant files a motion for a new trial and fails to
obtain a ruling on the motion prior to appeal.

In that instance,

this Court could refuse to consider the appropriateness of the
motion.

See State v. Fierst, 692 P.2d 751, 753 (Utah 1984).

This Court should refuse to consider whether the trial court
should have ruled on the motion to disqualify himself in this
case because defendant has waived the issue by failing to bring
it to the attention of the trial court.
Defendant's guilty plea also operates as a waiver of
this claim.

A voluntary guilty plea waives all claims of error-

occurring prior to the plea except jurisdictional claims.
v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989).

State

The trial judge's

failure to disqualify himself is not jurisdictional.

While the

existence of bias and prejudice relieves the individual judge
from presiding over the controversy, the actual jurisdiction of
the court is unaffected.

Thus, defendant waived his claim if

this Court upholds his guilty plea.
Furthermore, defendant's motion to disqualify Judge
Eves was not made on ihe basis of bias or prejudice.

Rule 29,

Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-29 (Supp. 1989)(repealed July 1, 1990),
contemplates a situation where the judge may lack the
impartiality required to fairly judge the issues in the case.

-6-

"Bias and prejudice mean a hostile feeling or spirit of ill will
toward one of the litigants, or undue friendship or favoritism
toward one."

Haslam v. Morrison, 190 P.2d 520, 523 (Utah 1948).

Defendant wants Judge Eves to appear as a witness if the case is
retried.

Because Judge Eves determined that defendant would not

be allowed to withdraw his plea, no new trial will be held.
Defendant is not prejudiced by the judge's failure to disqualify
himself because the judge is not going to be a witness in this
case.
Defendant argues that it is troublesome that the judge
was the factfinder at trial and that he did not agree to waive
the jury.

He states that he cannot be sure that Judge Eves did

not rely on some fact that he might have known about the
partition sale to find that the evidence supported his plea.
This assertion might be valid if Judge Eves did attend the
partition sale and if the validity of the partition sale had been
questioned at defendant's trial.

Notwithstanding that current

counsel would like to raise the issue of the validity of the
sale, trial counsel did not raise any questions concerning the
validity or facts of the partition sale itself.

The fact that

defendant no longer owns an interest in the land because of that
partition sale was only disputed by defendant's claim of some
adverse or prescriptive possessory interest obtained through his
continued use of the land.

Defendant conceded that the partition

occurred and that he accepted money for his interest in the land.
Thus, Judge Eves was not called upon to find anything with regard
to the validity of the sale and defendant's concerns are
unfounded.
-7-

Furthermore, defendant did waive the jury.

Defendant

quotes only the portion of the transcript that might be
interpreted to support his position.

After the exchange quoted

by defendant, however, the following occurred:
THE COURT: Mr. Frank Gentry has throughout
these questions nodded in agreement with each
of the answers or answered vocally. And the
record should reflect that he appears to be
in total agreement with what has been
presented.
Are you in agreement, Mr- Gentry, with
what has been presented here in the court?
MR. F. GENTRY:

I do.

(T. 7-8). The portion of the transcript quoted by defendant is
taken out of context.

The questioning of the defendants

concerning the jury waiver prior to the material quoted by
defendant also supports that defendant knew he was waiving the
jury:
MR. SPAFFORD: And you understand that if you
waive it, you waive that right to the trial
by jury? And do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANTS:

(No audible response.)

MR. SPAFFORD: As a substitute for the jury,
Judge Eves would act as the trier of fact?
THE COURT: Mr. Gentry, I'll have to ask you
to answer vocally.
MR. C. GENTRY:

Yes. We do understand that.

THE COURT: Hold on, Mr. Spafford. Just a
second.
Mr. Frank Gentry, are you understanding
these questions?
MR. F. GENTRY: Yes.
(T. 5). When read together with all of the conversation
regarding waiver of the jury and exclusion of the witnesses,
-8-

defendant's "no" response cannot be read to mean he did not want
to waive the jury.
Unless this Court finds that defendant should be
allowed to withdraw his plea, there will be no trial and Judge
Eves cannot be a witness.

For these reasons, and because the

motion to disqualify was untimely filed, even if the judge
technically violated Rule 29 by not ruling on the motion, there
was no prejudice; and there is no reason to remand the case.
POINT II
DEFENDANT WAIVED CONSIDERATION OF HIS MOTION
FOR A NEW TRIAL BY FAILING TO PURSUE THE
MOTION IN THE TRIAL COURT.
On August 28, 1989, four months after he moved to
withdraw his guilty plea and four days prior to the court's
ruling on that motion, defendant filed a motion for a new trial.
The motion for a new trial claimed that the 1981 partition sale
of defendant's interest in the ranch was void or voidable due to
irregularities, thus, the sale was an invalid basis for a
conviction of theft under the facts of this case.

There is no

ruling or any other indication in the record that the court ever
considered the motion.

Defendant claims on appeal that the trial

court erred in not ruling on the motion and requests a remand for
a ruling.

Defendant waived consideration of the motion by

failing to seek a ruling from the trial court, and this Court
should refuse to remand the case for further proceedings.
This case was on appeal when defense counsel sought a
stay to allow the trial court to consider a motion to withdraw
his guilty plea (R. 157). This was done in apparent recognition
of the principle that this Court will not consider the validity
-9-

of a guilty plea unless the defendant first moves to withdraw the
plea in the trial court.
1311 (Utah 1987).

See State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309,

Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court will not

rule on the propriety of a motion for a new trial where the trial
court has not ruled on the motion.

State v. Fierst, 692 P.2d

751, 753 (Utah 1984) .
The Utah Supreme Court did not remand the Fierst case
for consideration of a motion for a new trial that had not been
ruled upon by the trial court.

The Court had this to say:

Finally, and most importantly, there* is no
indication in the record that this memorandum
was ever brought to the trial court's
attention, much less passed upon. It merely
appears in the file along with various appeal
documents dated the same day. Unless such an
issue is raised before the trial court, it
cannot be considered here for the first time.
Id. at 753 (citation omitted).

In this case, defense counsel did

nothing to bring the motion for a new trial to the trial court's
attention.

There is no indication in the record that Judge Eves

was even aware that the belated motion was filed.

When counsel

received a copy of the September 1, 1989 ruling which did not
include a ruling on the motion for a new trial, it was his
responsibility to request consideration of the motion.

This is

especially true where this appeal was stayed at the request of
defense counsel to allow the trial court to consider and rule on
defendant's motion to withdraw the plea.

The failure to object

to Judge Eves' ruling should bar defendant from obtaining another
remand for consideration of the motion for a new trial.
This Court may also refuse to remand this case because
the motion for a new trial was untimely.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-

24(c) (1978)(repealed July 1, 1990) requires that a motion for a
new trial be filed within 10 days of the judgment.

As the

Supreme Court noted in Fierst, 692 P.2d at 753, an untimely
motion for a new trial could be denied for that reason alone.
See also State v. Day, case no. 890346-CA, slip op. at 2 (Utah
Ct. App. filed Feb. 1, 1990)(unpublished opinion).

Defendant

alleged no ground requiring the trial court to allow the motion
to be filed out of time.

For this reason, this Court need not:

remand this case for consideration of the motion for a new trial.
Finally, in his Statement of Facts, defendant
repeatedly refers to an affidavit of Ruby Jane Roberts dated
November 30, 1989 which he includes in his brief at Addendum A.
See App. Br. at 2-5.

Also included in Addendum A of his brief

are a letter purportedly written by a Ken Chamberlain, an order
from the Sevier County Probate Court, and a transcript of
proceedings in the probate court.

Defendant asserts in footnote

2 of his brief that he would have presented these facts to the
trial court in support of his motion for a new trial if the court
had considered the motion.

The affidavit was not even signed

when defendant filed his motion for a new trial.

Neither the

affidavit nor the other items contained in Addendum A of the
brief were filed in the trial court.
record on appeal.

They are not part of the

All references to this affidavit and the

attachments are inappropriate and irrelevant and should be
ignored by this Court.

State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah

1986).

-11-

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA.
This case went to trial on January 25, 1989. After all
of the evidence had been presented on both sides, and just prior
to closing arguments, defendant decided to accept a plea bargain.
The State agreed to dismiss the criminal trespass charge if
defendant pled guilty to third degree felony theft.

Defendant

agreed to probation on the condition, inter alia, that he must
stay away from the Fremont Ranch.

Imposition of sentence was

stayed pending successful completion of probation.
After he pled guilty, defendant filed a notice of
appeal.

He then moved to stay the appeal so that he could file a

motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

On April 6, 1989 defendant

moved to withdraw his guilty plea (R. 117). He raised three
issues:

(1) he did not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently

waive his right to a jury trial, (2) he did not understand that
by pleading guilty he stood convicted of a felony, and (3) he was
denied his right to a preliminary hearing on the amended charge.
At the initial hearing on his motion, on May 1, 1989, defendant
added a fourth issue:

(4) he did not understand the elements of

the crime in relationship to the facts.

Judge Eves took the

motion under advisement and continued the hearing on the fourth
issue (R. 199, 232) .
Neither defendant nor his attorney appeared at the
August 7, 1989 hearing (R. 209). Judge Eves gave defense counsel
15 days to file a memorandum and gave the prosecutor 10 days to
respond (R. 209). On September 1, 1989 Judge Eves denied the
motion to withdraw the plea (R. 230-34).
-12-

On appeal defendant claims that Judge Eves abused his
discretion in refusing to grant the motion to withdraw his plea.
He claims his plea was unintelligent, unknowing and involuntary
for four reasons:

(1) he did not understand the elements of the
2
crime in relationship to the facts,
(2) he had a hearing
impairment, (3) there was no affidavit of defendant supporting
3
his plea, and (4) he did not understand the plea agreement.
Defendant's arguments are contradicted by the record and the
trial court's ruling should be affirmed.
A defendant is not entitled to withdraw a guilty plea
as a matter of right.
(Utah 1987).

State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040, 1041

This Court should not interfere with the trial

court's decision on a motion to withdraw a plea unless the judge
clearly abused his discretion.
422, 424 (Utah 1987).

State v. Mildenhall, 747 P.2d

The burden is on the defendant to

establish good cause for the motion, Utah Code Ann. § 77-136(2)(a) (Supp. 1989), and to establish on appeal that the trial
court abused its discretion in denying the motion, State v.
Larson, 560 P.2d 335, 336 (Utah 1977).

Defendant has failed to

carry his burden in both instances.
Defendant attended an entire trial in which all of the
evidence supporting a conviction of theft was presented.

The

Defendant also argues in a separate subpoint that the
trial court's ruling that the record as a whole establishes that
defendant understood the facts in relationship to the elements of
the crime was incorrect. A discussion of this assertion will be
included in the discussion of reason (1).
3
While defendant's approaches to these arguments has
shifted in focus somewhat from the documents filed in the trial
court, they appear to have been raised there, even if only
briefly. See R. 117-32, and 243-49.
-13-

lower court ruled at the time of the plea, and in the order
denying the motion to withdraw the plea, that this record
established that defendant was fully informed of the facts upon
which his guilty plea rested (T. 181, R. 232-33).

The evidence

presented at trial supported a conviction of theft (R. 233).
Regardless of any failure of the court to recite to defendant or
have defendant recite the facts, there is no question that
defendant was fully aware of the facts.
This case is similar to Jolivet v. Cook,
115 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 18 (1989).

P.2d

,

In Jolivet, the Supreme Court

held that the record as a whole established that a defendant who
attended a preliminary hearing where the evidence supporting the
charges had been presented, was aware of the facts supporting his
guilty plea.

Here, defendant attended an entire trial before

changing his plea to guilty.
the theft charge.

Defendant's own testimony supported

He admitted accepting payment for his share of

the ranch and knowing that meant he has no interest in the land
(T. 127). He knew the family members/owners of the ranch, wanted
him off of the land (T. 130). There is no question that he
accepted money for leasing the ranch for grazing to Stirling
Carlisle.

The trial judge was convinced beyond a reasonable

doubt that defendant is guilty of theft (R. 233). There was a
factual basis for the plea and defendant understood th^sc faoL^.
Despite Judge Eves ruling at the time of the plea that
there was a factual basis for it, defendant argues that the
record as a whole does not establish that he understood what he
had heard during the trial.

He appears to assert that Rule 11,

strictly construed, requires the judge to ask him if he
-14-

understood the facts.

See State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92,

94 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)(strict compliance with Rule 11 required
under State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987)).
Recent opinions of the Utah Supreme Court clarify State
v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), as it relates to the
"record as a whole" standard of review applied in a line of cases
beginning with Warner v. Morris, 709 P.2d 309 (Utah 1985).
Jolivet, decided two years after Gibbons, finds that
although the trial judge did not strictly comply with Rule 11
when Jolivet entered his plea,
'[t]he absence of a finding under [section
77-35-11] is not critical so long as the
record as a whole affirmatively establishes
that the defendant entered his plea with full
knowledge and understanding of its
consequences and of the rights he was
waiving.' State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405
(Utah 1986); Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310,
311 (Utah 1985); Warner v. Morris, 709 P.2d
309, 310 (Utah 1985).
115 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18.

Interestingly, Judge Billings of this

Court sat in place of Justice Stewart in Jolivet.

Decided prior

to Jolivet, but after Gibbons, State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266
(Utah 1988), also applies the record as a whole test.

The

Copeland court said:
The United States Supreme Court has said,
M
[T]here is no adequate substitute for
demonstrating in the record at the time the
plea is entered the defendant's understanding
of the nature of the charge against him."
McCarthy \v. United States 1, 394 U.S. [459,]
470 . . . (emphasis in the original). We
think the most effective way to do this is to
have a defendant state in his own words his
understanding of the offense and the actions
which make him guilty of the offense. By
this statement, the trial court can assure
itself that the defendant is truly submitting
a voluntary and knowing plea. Moreover, the
-15-

record on appeal will clearly reflect the
defendant's understanding• Although this
method is therefore preferable to others, it
is not absolutely required. The test is
voluntariness.
765 P.2d at 1273 (footnote omitted).

These cases make it clear

that the test is whether the record as a whole establishes that
the plea is voluntary, knowing and intelligent.

This Court's

holdings in State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah Ct. App.
1989), and State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92, 94 (Utah Ct. App.
1988), that M[s]trict, and not just substantial, compliance with
the rule [that the examination must be by the court on the record
at the time of the plea] is required," Valencia, 776 P.2d at 1334
is inconsistent with recent Utah Supreme Court rulings and should
not be followed.
Furthermore, this "strict compliance" test is also
inconsistent with Gibbons and other case law previously decided
by the Supreme Court.

A close reading of Gibbons reveals that

the Court was simply pointing out the much preferred and safest
method of determining the voluntariness of a plea.

The Supreme

Court had before it in Gibbons a transcript of the plea hearing,
740 P.2d at 1310-11.

Since the Court was able to review the

transcript and determined that the examination of the defendant
was inadequate, it seems likely that they would have remanded the
case with an order that the plea be withdrawn rather than
remanding for a hearing on the issue of voluntariness if they
intended to impose a rule of strict Rule 11 compliance.

This

viewpoint is reinforced by Copeland's clear statement that strict
Rule 11 compliance is not absolutely required when a guilty plea
is otherwise voluntary.
1 C

The State agrees that it is much preferred to have all
of these findings on the record at the plea hearing.

In some

cases, however, judges have overlooked certain aspects of Rule 11
at the time of the plea.

Where there is a record that

establishes that the defendant pled voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently, it seems unnecessary to invalidate a plea simply
because the judge overlooked parts of the Rule 11 examination in
court.
For example, in State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah
1986), the Court held that violations of Rule 11 do not
automatically invalidate an otherwise voluntary plea.
stated:
A final word on the State's Rule 11
arguments. In its zeal to set aside Kay's
guilty pleas or renege on the bargain that
was struck, the State has argued, in effect,
that otherwise voluntary and lawful guilty
pleas should always be voided when the trial
court violates any provision of Rule 11. The
concurring opinions of Chief Justice Hall and
Justice Howe adopt this reasoning as well.
This position is shortsighted, for to follow
it would be to sanction a remedy far worse
than the wrong. If we were to hold that any
violation of Rule 11 automatically voids the
resultant plea, even when the plea is
knowingly and voluntarily entered, we would
encourage defendants, convicted and sentenced
after such a plea to attack their convictions
for purely tactical reasons, either by direct
appeal or by seeking habeas corpus long after
the fact. We have refused to overturn
convictions upon such challenges in the past
and we find no reason to encourage such
attacks in the future.
Overturning such convictions—which we
would have to do if we embraced the rationale
advanced by the State and the Chief Justice's
concurring opinion—would require the State
to reprosecute numerous defendants, probably
long after the challenged guilty pleas were
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The Court

entered and when the passage of time would
make reprosecution impractical, if not
impossible. Almost certainlyf the ultimate
result would be to free a number of convicted
persons for nothing more than technical
errors in the acceptance of their voluntary
guilty pleas.
Kay, 717 P.2d at 1301-02 (footnote and citations omitted).
Importantly, Gibbons did not overrule Kay.
to Kay, Miller, Brooks or Warner.

Nor did it even cite

Given the Utah Supreme Court's

recent reliance on the Miller, Brooks and Warner line of cases,
it does not appear that it was mere oversight that the Court did
not overrule these cases.

Instead, it appears that the record as

a whole test remains viable even after Gibbons.
It may be argued that Copeland and Jolivet represent
cases where the Supreme Court was applying the record as a whole
test only because the pleas were entered before Gibbons was
decided.

This argument gains some support from the Court's

recent refusal to apply Gibbons to a pre-Gibbons plea on the
theory that the Gibbons decision was a clear break with the past
and consequently not retroactive.

See State v. Hickman, 779 P.2d

670, 672 n. 1 (Utah 1989) .
Hickman, although troublesomef is not controlling when
closely analyzed.

First, it is a per curiam decision.

Second,

it ignores that the Court applied the record as a whole test in
Jolivet after stating the Gibbons requirements but without
distinguishing the case on the basis that it was a pre-Gibbons
plea.

The Court did not even cite Gibbons in Copeland, thus,

indicating no concern that Gibbons was inconsistent with its
holding.

Notably, the Court does not even state the date of
-18-

Jolivet's plea and mentions only in passing the date of
Copeland's plea without assigning any particular significance to
the date.

The Court's willingness to apply the record as a whole

test in these two cases without explaining that there was any
reason other than that it is the test to be applied indicates
that the Court believes just that—that the test is
voluntariness, not strict compliance with rigid Rule 11
recitations.

Were it otherwise, it is likely that the Court

would have overruled Miller, Kay, Brooks, and Warner; or at least
have expressly limited their application to pre-Gibbons cases.
The Court simply has done neither and this Court should
reconsider its rigid application of a strict Rule 11 compliance
standard with this line of cases in mind.
Defendant further asserts that there was confusion
about whether he was tried for theft by deception or theft.

His

argument centers around a complaint about the manner of charging
and filing of the information.

Defects in an information are

waived by failing to raise them prior to entry of a guilty plea.
State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989).

Here the

information was amended at trial to theft (R. 26). There is no
objection in the record to that amendment.

Absence of an

objection, along with the waiver incurred by pleading guilty,
require this Court to ignore any claim about the sufficiency of
the information.

Id.

See also Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-12(b)(1)

(1978) (Repealed July 1, 1990).
Defendant argues that the record does not support that
he was aware of the facts supporting his plea, nor that he
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understood the plea agreement, because he has a hearing
impairment.

The record discloses that defendant has a hearing

impairment (T. 8 ) , however, the record also discloses that
defendant's guilty plea was not rendered involuntary, unknowing
4
or unintelligent by that impairment.
At no time during the trial did defendant or his
attorneys indicate that defendant had not heard the testimony of
any witnesses.

The trial court was made aware of the hearing

impairment at the beginning of trial and indicated the court
would try to comply with defendant's request to increase the
volume and decrease the tone of voice.

During cross examination,

the prosecutor asked defendant if the prosecutor was speaking
loud enough (T. 126). Defendant responded that he was and asked
only that he slow down.

The record reveals that efforts were

made to accommodate defendant, and defendant did not indicate any
difficulties in hearing the testimony.

Absent any complaints at

the time of the trial, the trial court was not obliged to accept
defendant's later claims that he could not hear the testimony of
other witnesses.
At the time of his plea defendant stated at one point
that he had not heard everything that had just been said
regarding the plea agreement.

After that time, however, every

element of the plea agreement was repeated to defendant at least
once.

See T. 176-87.

Defendant's responses to the court's

4
The letter offered in Addendum D of Appellant's Brief
is not part of the record and should be ignored. State v. Cook,
714 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah 1986)(reference to matters outside the
record are inappropriate and irrelevant and will not be
considered).

questions and defendant's own questions about the parameters of
his agreement not to go onto the ranch indicate that defendant
heard what was being said to him.

Again the judge was not

required to accept defendant's later claims that the did not hear
what was said where the record discloses that he did.
Defendant also argues that his guilty plea was
involuntary, unknowing, and unintelligent because the court did
not use an affidavit.

There is, however, no requirement that a

court use a plea affidavit.

There is a requirement that the

court make a record supporting the plea,

See Utah Code Ann. §

77-35-11 (Supp. 1989)(repealed July 1, 1990), and see State v.
Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1308, 1313 (Utah 1987).

The record made by the

trial court at the time of the plea is sufficient to support the
plea.
Finally, defendant argues that he should be allowed to
withdraw his plea because he did not understand that he was
convicted of a felony as a result of his plea.
discloses that he did understand this.

The record

The following occurred:

THE COURT: All right. Now, you understand
that if you do that, you give up your right
to have me decide the case. There won't be
any other opportunity to present evidence.
You'll stand convicted of a felony until
you've completed probation and come back to
have the conviction wiped off your record.
Do you understand that?
MR. F. GENTRY: Yes.

THE COURT: "Normal" is a relative term, but
you appear to be in full possession of your
faculties. You appear to understand the
questions that I asked you.

-21-

MR. F. GENTRY:

I do.

THE COURT: And your answers are responsive
to those questions. You appear to understand
what is going on.
Do you?
MR. F. GENTRY:

I do.

I've learned a lot.

(T. 177, 180). These exchanges indicate that defendant knew he
was being convicted of a felony.

They also clearly indicate

that, if defendant satisfactorily completes probation, the
conviction will be removed from his record.

Regardless of what

label trial counsel attached to the plea arrangement, the
arrangement was adequately explained to defendant on the record
at the time of his plea.
The foregoing argument establishes that defendant's
plea was knowing, voluntary and intelligent.

The trial court did

not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the
plea.

POINT IV
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO REVERSAL OF HIS
CONVICTION EITHER BECAUSE HE WAIVED HIS
CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
BY PLEADING GUILTY, OR BECAUSE COUNSEL WAS
EFFECTIVE.
Defendant asserts that trial counsel was ineffective
for three reasons.

He claims that counsel should have withdrawn

from representing him when his codefendant received a plea
bargain dismissing the charges against him, should have
investigated the facts and other defenses, and should have moved
to disqualify the trial judge.

None of these claims establish

ineffective assistance of counsel.

First, defendant entered a guilty plea in this case.
If this Court affirms the order denying defendant's motion to
withdraw his plea, the Court can find that defendant's claims of
ineffectiveness are waived.

A voluntary guilty plea waives all

claims of error occurring prior to the plea except jurisdictional
claims.

State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989).

None

of defendant's claims affect the jurisdiction of the trial court.
Defendant may argue that the question of whether the
trial court should have disqualified itself is jurisdictional.
This concept is easily discarded.

While the existence of bias or

prejudice relieves the individual judge from presiding over the
controversy, the actual jurisdiction of the court is unaffected.
Also, defendant makes no claim that a claim of bias and prejudice
of the trial judge cannot be waived.
Furthermore, the record does not establish that counsel
was ineffective.

In evaluating an ineffective counsel claim,

this Court must determine both that counsel rendered a deficient
performance that fell below an objective standard of reasonable
professional judgment and that defendant was prejudiced by the
performance before it may reverse defendant's conviction.
v. Gardner,

P.2d

, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 12 (1989); State

v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 893 (Utah 1989).

Defendant must

overcome a strong presumption that counsel was adequate.
v. Bullock,

P.2d

State

State

, 119 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 36 (1989); State

v. Moritzsky, 771 P.2d 688, 690 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Prejudice

is established where this Court's confidence in the verdict is
undermined because there is a reasonable likelihood of a
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different result if counsel had not performed deficiently.

State

v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217, 219 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Defendant has not established that it was unreasonable
professional judgment for trial counsel not to argue that the
1981 partition sale was void or voidable.

Nor does he establish

that there would likely have been a different result if this
argument had been made, or if counsel had withdrawn, or the trial
judge had been disqualified.

For this reason, his conviction

should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court
to affirm the lower court's finding that defendant's guilty plea
was valid and deny his request for a new trial.
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PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal from an order denying defendant's motion
for a new trial. We affirm.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of rape, a first degree
felony. Judgment was entered on October 6, 1987. Defendant
had been represented at trial by court-appointed defense
counsel. Defendant did not appeal the conviction.
On October 20, 1988, defendant, without the assistance of
an attorney, filed a motion for new trial on the basis of newly
discovered evidence. The motion stated that newly discovered
evidence indicating that the victim consented to sexual
intercourse would be presented to the court at the time of the
hearing. It was not accompanied by affidavits indicating the
substance of the evidence or identifying its sources.
Defendant noticed a hearing on the motion for November 10,
1988. At the hearing, defendant moved the court for a
continuance to obtain affidavits as to the new evidence. The
motion was denied. The trial court also denied the motion for
new trial, finding "that defendant has not complied with Utah
Criminal Law procedures, that more than one year has lapsed
since defendant's trial and defendant failed to file the
necessary affidavits showing cause for new trial." Defendant
filed c notice of appeal and a motion seeking appointment of
counsel to pursue the appeal. The trial court granted the
motion to appoint counsel.
Defendant argues on appeal that (1) the motion for
continuance should have been granted, (2) the trial court erred
in failing to appoint legal counsel, and (3) the trial court
erred in ruling that the motion for new trial was not timely
filed and could not be considered. Utah R. Crim. Pro. 24
provides, in relevant part:

(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or
upon its own initiative, grant a new trial in
the interest of justice if there is any error
or impropriety which had a substantial adverse
effect upon the rights of a party.
(b) A motion for new trial shall be made in
writing and upon notice. The motion shall be
accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the
essential facts in support of the motion. If
additional time is required to procure
affidavits or evidence the court may postpone
the hearing on the motion for such time as it
deems reasonable.
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made
within 10 days after imposition of sentence,
or within such further time as the court may
fix during the ten-day period

Defendant's motion for new trial was filed roughly one year
after the imposition of sentence. While not disputing the
untimeliness of the motion, defendant contends that the trial
court erred in not considering the motion "upon its own
initiative" under Rule 24(a). Defendant's argument is, in
practical terms, that the trial court should have adopted his
motion as its own, thereby relieving defendant of the time
limit for filing the motion. Rule 24 allows a trial court to
make its own motion for new trial based on its determination
that such a motion is "in the interest of justice." While the
rule contains no specific time limit for a sua sponte motion by
the trial court, we find no basis to premise error on refusal
to adopt defendant's untimely motion.
The determination to grant or deny a motion for new trial
is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be set
aside on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v.
Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985). It follows from
Williams and the language of Rule 24 that a trial court's
decision to make a motion for new trial on its own initiative
is also discretionary. We conclude that under the
circumstances of this case, it was not an abuse of discretion
to refuse to consider a motion for new trial filed roughly one
year after the imposition of sentence.1 Our disposition of
the timeliness issue makes it unnecessary to consider further
defendant's argument that he should have been granted a
continuance to procure affidavits.
1. The state correctly notes that defendant may seek postconviction relief under Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(i) on the basis of
newly discovered evidence.

Defendant's remaining contention on appeal is that the
trial court should have appointed counsel to assist him in the
motion for new trial. Appellant was assisted by
court-appointed counsel throughout the trial in this matter.
The order appointing counsel in June of 1987 recites that the
attorney was "to represent the defendant in all matters
pertinent to this action unless or until relieved by this
court." A trial court may appoint counsel for an indigent
criminal defendant if the defendant requests counsel or if the
trial court "on its own motion" so orders and defendant does
not "affirmatively waive or reject the opportunity of record to
be represented." Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-2 (Supp. 1982).
Defendant made no request for counsel at the time he filed the
motion for new trial, but claims that the trial court's failure
to appoint counsel on its own motion was erroneous.
It is
undisputed that defendant did not request counsel at the time
he filed a motion for new trial and notice of hearing. The
next inquiry is whether defendant knowingly and intelligently
waived his right to appointed counsel. See State v. Frampton,
737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987). Although a "colloquy on the
record" with the trial court is the preferred method of
ascertaining the validity of a waiver, an appellate court "will
look at any evidence in the record which shows a defendant's
actual awareness of the risks of proceeding pro se", which
"turns upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding
each case." 111. at 188. The record in this case demonstrates
that defendant knew he was entitled to appointed counsel
because he had been represented by appointed counsel at trial.
The motion for new trial also reflects that defendant was aware
of the substantive requirements of a motion for new trial and,
nevertheless, elected not to request new counsel or contact
previous counsel tc prepare and file the documents. We
conclude that defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his
right to counsel, and the trial court did not err in not
appointing counsel on its own motion.
The order of the trial court denying a motion for new trial
is affirmed.

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

